A Tale of Two Houses? Post-legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament by Caygill T
1 
 
A Tale of Two Houses? Post-legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament 
 
 
Tom Caygill 
School of Geography, Politics and Sociology 
Newcastle University 
 
Paper prepared for the  
Academic Seminar on Post-Legislative Scrutiny  
(London, 10 July 2018),  
co-organized by the Institute for Advanced Legal Studies (IALS)  
of the University of London 
and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) 
 
 
Keywords: post-legislative scrutiny, committees, recommendations, scrutiny, UK Parliament 
 
Summary: 
In the last decade a more systematic approach to post-legislative scrutiny has been taken by both the 
UK Government and Parliament. Currently, due to a lack of systematic scrutiny we do not know how 
both Houses of the UK Parliament are undertaking post-legislative scrutiny. The aim of the paper is to 
determine the similarities and differences between the House of Commons and House of Lords when 
undertaking post-legislative scrutiny. This paper addresses this gap in knowledge through the use of 
four case studies from both Houses. These case studies address how they select legislation for review, 
what recommendations they produce and how they deal with the follow up to government responses. 
The paper finds that there are a number of differences in the way legislation is selected by both Houses 
and also highlights the differences between them in terms of the output of their recommendations. 
Overall this paper contributes to our knowledge of the processes available to the UK Parliament for 
the undertaking of post-legislative scrutiny. This is important as post-legislative scrutiny, as a 
formalized activity is relatively new, and there is a contribution to be made here in terms of how such 
procedures can be utilized in other legislatures. 
 
Introduction 
Post-legislative scrutiny is one of the core tasks of departmental select committees in the House of 
Commons1. In the last decade a more systematic approach has been taken by both the UK Government 
and UK Parliament. With regards to the House of Commons, since 2008 government departments 
have been required to prepare and publish memoranda, assessing whether an Act of Parliament has 
                                                          
1 House of Commons Liaison Committee. Select committee effectiveness, resources and powers. November 2012. HC 697. 
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met its key objectives, within three to five years of the Act entering the statue books2,3,4. These 
memoranda are then presented to departmental select committees for additional scrutiny. With 
regards to the House of Lords, in 2012 the Liaison Committee promised to appoint at least one ad hoc 
committee per session to undertake post-legislative scrutiny on a subject chosen by it5. 
 
Currently, due to a lack of systematic scrutiny we do not know how both Houses of the UK Parliament 
are undertaking post-legislative scrutiny and what the main differences are. The aim of the paper 
therefore is to determine the similarities and differences between the House of Commons and House 
of Lords when undertaking post-legislative scrutiny. In so doing it addresses the following research 
questions; what differences are there a) in the way both Houses select legislation for post-legislative 
scrutiny, b) in the outputs of post-legislative scrutiny; and c) in the way committees follow up on 
government responses. This paper will provide an evaluation of the current procedures. This has 
important implications on highlighting how the system is currently working and whether this is a 
process worth recreating in other legislatures. 
 
This paper aims to address this gap in knowledge through the use of four case studies from both the 
House of Commons and the House of Lords. These case studies address how the respective Houses 
and committees select legislation for review, what the outputs of their scrutiny were and finally 
whether they followed up.  
This paper contributes to our knowledge of the processes available to the UK Parliament for the 
undertaking of post-legislative scrutiny. This is also important as post-legislative scrutiny, as a 
formalized activity of Parliaments is relatively new, and there is a contribution to be made here in 
terms of how such procedures can be utilized in other legislatures. There is also a contribution to make 
hear regarding the relationship between the two Houses.  
 
Committees undertaking post-legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament 
As noted, post-legislative scrutiny is undertaken by two different types of committee in the UK 
Parliament; departmental select committees in the House of Commons and ad hoc committees in the 
House of Lords. As such the literature on these two types of committees should give an early indication 
of the similarities and differences between the two Houses in this area. 
 
Departmental Select Committees – House of Commons 
                                                          
2 Cabinet Office. Guide to Making Legislation. July 2012. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/210917/Guide_to_Making_Legislation_J
uly_2013.pdf. (Accessed on: 8th February 2014). 
3 R. Kelly. Modernisation: Select Committees – pay for chairs. House of Commons Library Standard Note. February 2014. 
SN/PC/02725. 
4 R. Kelly & M. Everett. Post-Legislative Scrutiny. House of Commons Library Standard Note. May 2013. SN/PC/05232. 
5 House of Lords Liaison Committee. Review of select committee activity and proposals for new committee activity. March 
2012. HL 279. 
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The Hansard Society6, as with other academics such as Longley & Davidson7, Shaw8 and Strom9  regard 
departmental select committees as the main vehicle for promoting a culture of scrutiny and 
accountability in the House of Commons. Select committees in the UK undertake a range of ten core 
tasks, of which post-legislative scrutiny is just one10. The competition between core tasks sees 
committees focus upon breath rather than depth in inquiries. 
These sessional committees were created in 1979 and perform an important scrutiny function. Their 
success in holding the executive to account comes from the fact that these committees do not have 
power over things which greatly matter to government’s survival, such as the passage of legislation 
and the budget. As they are less of a threat to the passage of government bills and the government’s 
survival, they are treated in a different way to the chamber11,12. This has allowed them to develop 
somewhat free of party control. They set their own agendas13 and aim to produce reports on a cross 
party basis14. The emphasis of these committees was to enhance the role of individual MPs (as 
opposed to parties) in influencing decision making15. Select committees give backbenchers from both 
sides of the House the ability to contribute, in a less partisan manner to the scrutiny of government. 
As such, committees have significantly improved the processes of scrutiny in ways in which the House 
of Commons chamber could not, e.g. the willingness of select committees to rigorously scrutinize 
government agencies, not just government departments, and request written and oral evidence from 
them16.  
Recent reforms have increased the importance and influence of select committees, these reforms 
included the election of committee chairs, which has given them a welcome boost in legitimacy17, and 
members, removing the patronage powers of the whips and government18,19. There has also been an 
increase in the levels of independence among backbenches, which has contributed to a greater sense 
of independence among committees20. Such select committees are now flexing their muscles21. This 
has reduced criticisms laid at select committees’ doors such as those of Flinders22 that the government 
could steer committees away from controversial issues of scrutiny. However it is possible that 
governments can find other ways to steer committees away from controversial issues such as 
publishing draft bills for departmental select committees to scrutinize, taking up more of their 
                                                          
6 Hansard Society. The Challenge for Parliament: Making Government Accountable: Report of the Hansard Society 
Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny. London, Hansard Society. 2001. 
7 L.D. Longley & R.H. Davidson. ‘Parliamentary committees: Changing perspectives on changing institutions’. Journal of 
Legislative Studies. Vol. 4, No. 2, 1998, pp. 1–20. 
8 M. Shaw. ‘Parliamentary committees: A global perspective’. Journal of Legislative Studies. Vol. 4, No. 1, 1998, pp. 225–
251. 
9 K. Strom. ‘Parliamentary committees in European democracies’. Journal of Legislative Studies. Vol. 4, No. 1, 1998, pp. 21–
59. 
10 House of Commons Liaison Committee, 2012. 
11 P. Giddings. ‘Select Committees and Parliamentary Scrutiny: Plus Ça Change’. Parliamentary Affairs. Vol. 47, No. 4, 1994, 
pp. 669–686. 
12 Hansard Society, 2001. 
13 P. Norton. Parliament in British Politics. 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan. 2013. 
14 M. Russell & P. Cowley. ‘The Policy Power of the Westminster Parliament: The “Parliamentary State” and the Empirical 
Evidence’. Governance. Vol. 29, No. 1, 2016, pp. 121–137. 
15 Giddings, 1994. 
16 Hansard Society, 2001. 
17 H. White. Select Committees under Scrutiny. London, Institute for Government. 2015 
18 M. Benton & M. Russell. ‘Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary Oversight Committees: The Select Committees in the 
British House of Commons’. Parliamentary Affairs. Vol. 66, No. 4, 2013, pp. 772–797. 
19 M. Russell. ‘Never Allow a Crisis Go To Waste’: The Wright Committee Reforms to Strengthen the House of Commons’. 
Parliamentary Affairs. Vol. 64, No. 4, 2011, pp. 612–633. 
20 White, 2015. 
21 E. Crewe. The House of Commons: An Anthropology of MPs at Work. London, Bloomsbury Academic. 2015. 
22 M. Flinders. The Politics of Accountability in the Modern State. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing. 2001 
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available time.  While criticisms may remain, improvements have been made since 2010, which may 
mean that some of the issues raised in literature prior to these reforms require qualification. D’Arcy23 
notes in his article on the post 2010 Parliament that committees are more powerful and independently 
minded than ever before.  
Benton & Russell24 undertook an extensive study of the impact of select committees in Westminster. 
Their research concluded that although select committees could be more influential, their findings did 
challenge those who suggest that committees are ignored by government. In fact their research 
showed that committees have become an integral part of policy making, due to their detailed 
approach of scrutinising government policy and actions. Government departments are thus more 
willing to engage with committees in order so they do not fall foul of them later on in the policy 
process.  
These departmental select committees are sessional, so continue for the duration of a Parliament, 
have multiple core tasks of which post-legislative scrutiny is just one, they set their own agendas and 
in terms of scope they got for breath rather than depth. This is different to ad hoc committees in the 
House of Lords. 
 
Select/ad hoc committees – House of Lords 
Since the 1970s, the House of Lords has developed a number of permanent committees25, indeed 
before then it was very much a chamber orientated House26. House of Lords select committees tend 
to cover more crosscutting areas and do not shadow government departments27. So there is a clear 
difference here in terms of their structure. Indeed has been noted that Lords committees should make 
best use of Members knowledge, complement the work of the House of Commons and address cross-
departmental issues28. In comparison to the House of Commons the focus in the Lords is on depth 
rather than breadth, on the basis that Lords Committee do not have core tasks. There are some 
similarities here to as the same rules apply to Lords committees as they do to Commons committees 
regarding the government responding to reports and they also face similar challenges that Commons 
committees do29. In addition they tend to be consensual in nature30. However the membership of 
Lords committees is usually based on merit due the expertise present in the House31. Ad hoc 
committees have also been created since the 1970s and also form an important part of this committee 
structure in the House of Lords and their number set up each session was expanded in 201232. They 
are set up temporarily and disband after the publication of their reports, this is a key difference to 
sessional committees such as departmental select committees. They are popular among Peers as they 
allow topical issues to be examined without a permanent committee being appointed. As they are an 
established part of the committee structure in the House of Lords, there is competition in terms of 
Peers bidding for committees covering their preferred area being set up33. Russell argues that the 
                                                          
23 M. D’Arcy. ‘Time to salute the post-2010 Parliament’. BBC News. 2011. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-14330865. (Accessed on: 5th March 2015). 
24 Benton & Russell, 2013. 
25 R. Rogers & R. Walters. How Parliament Works. 7th ed. Abingdon, Routledge. 2015 
26 Norton, 2013. 
27 ibid. 
28 M. Russell. The Contemporary House of Lords. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 2013. 
29 Rogers & Walters, 2015. 
30 Norton, 2013. 
31 ibid. 
32 House of Lords Liaison Committee, 2012 
33 Rogers & Walters, 2015. 
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culture of Lords committees is different to committees in the Commons, they tend to tackle more 
strategic and longer term issues. They also tend to have a less adversarial relationship with 
government departments34. As with House of Commons committees, House of Lords committees are 
regarded as an effective mechanism when it comes to scrutinising the government.  
 
Methodology 
For the case study analysis, four select committee inquiries were chosen. The individual inquiries 
selected for this case study analysis were determined on the basis of the following criteria; they have 
undertaken a full post-legislative scrutiny inquiry; which took place between 2012-2017; and that 
Committee staff are still available for interview i.e. they have not moved on to work outside of 
Parliament. 
The cases chosen are all from parliamentary committees, who have similar procedures and powers, 
who the government is required to respond to in terms of their reports and correspondence and they 
are independent of government. The following committees and inquiries were assessed: 
 House of Commons Culture Media and Sport Committee – Gambling Act 2005 
 House of Commons Justice Committee – Freedom of Information Act 2000 
 House of Lords Select Committee on the Equality Act 2010 and Disability – disability elements 
of the Equality Act 2010 
 House of Lords Select Committee on the Licensing Act 2003 – Licensing Act 2003  
For each committee a representative of the committee secretariat and membership who took part in 
the inquiries were interviewed, with their remarks for attribution. In total 8 semi-structured interviews 
were undertaken (two per committee). 
In addition to the case study analysis, the recommendations of all post-legislative scrutiny inquiries 
between 2008 and 2017 were assessed to provide a comparison of the output of post-legislative 
scrutiny. These inquiries were located on House of Commons and House of Lords committee websites 
for all sessions between the 2005/2006 and 2016/2017 sessions. Following the location of these 
inquiries a content analysis of reports was undertaken in order to code committee recommendations 
and the government’s response to those reports. This involved the coding of twenty reports and 
twenty government responses. 
Recommendations were coded in terms of which organisations they were directed at, with the focus 
upon those directed at central government. There were 468 recommendations in total. Once formal 
recommendations directed at central government had been identified each recommendation was 
coded on the type of recommendation made, using a coding scheme deployed by35. Additionally the 
strength of change that the recommendation calls for was also coded. This employed a modified 
version of Russell and Benton’s36 coding scheme (no/small, medium and large change), with the scale 
increased to five on the basis of the types of changes that post-legislative scrutiny calls for. The 
medium action category was expanded into three separate categories to account for the differences 
in action classified under the medium category (e.g. calls for more resources versus calls for the 
                                                          
34 Russell, 2013. 
35 M. Russell & M. Benton. Selective Influence: The Policy Impact of House of Commons Select Committees. London, 
Constitution Unit. 2011. 
36 ibid. 
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amendment of primary legislation), as defined by Russell and Benton37. Additionally the no/small 
category has been separated into no action and small action, to account for the difference between 
no change and small change.  The categories used to measure strength of recommendation for this 
study are; (0) no action, (1) small action, (2) medium a action, (3) medium b action, (4) medium c 
action and (5) large action (see appendices for a full breakdown of coding descriptors). All reports 
were double coded and a random sample of committee reports were coded outside of the research 
team to ensure coder reliability.  
 
Differences in the selection of legislation 
There are differences in how the two Houses select legislation to receive post-legislative scrutiny, as 
was noted earlier in the paper the creation of ad hoc committees in the House of Lords is determined 
by the House of Lords Liaison Committee however in the House of Commons post-legislative scrutiny 
is one of the core tasks of departmental select committees and as such with their independence it is 
up to them to determine when to undertake such scrutiny.  
In relation to the House of Commons there are a number of reasons why a committee may decide to 
undertake post-legislative scrutiny and select the legislation that it does. The Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee’s inquiry into the Gambling Act 2005 was selected on the basis that they had received ‘a 
large number of representations from the gambling industry’38. The industry was concerned that 
legitimate commercial interests were being interfered with and that the Act was difficult to interpret 
due to it being overly complex39. Philip Davies, a member of the committee, noted that “it is common 
for organisations to approach committees with their concerns and problems”40. Another factor here 
was the fact that the Department of Culture, Media and Sport is generally not a department that 
sponsors many bills and legislative changes often are tacked on to other bills from other departments 
e.g. school sports being added to bills from the Department for Education41.  
In terms of the Justice Committee’s inquiry into the Freedom of Information Act 2000, it was selected 
because the Committee had received the memorandum from the Ministry of Justice and these 
government produced memoranda do often Act as a trigger for post-legislative scrutiny. So there is a 
benefit to the governments system of departmental post-legislative review. The issue was also salient 
at that particular moment as “the government was proposing to make changes to the Act in terms of 
narrowing the scope of and restricting the use of it”42. “The fact that the government wanted to make 
changes made it more urgent to get the report out as quickly as possible”43 on the basis that the 
committee wanted to share its assessment of the challenges before the government made a decision. 
The Chair also noted that there was “a reasonably high level of interest among the Members”44, 
                                                          
37 ibid. 
38 House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee. The Gambling Act 2005: a bet worth taking. July 
2012. HC 421. 
39 ibid 
40 Interview with Philip Davies MP, former member of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee. 
41 Interview with the former Clerk of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee. 
42 Interview with Lord Beith, former Chair of the Justice Committee. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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particularly as the committee had previously assessed whether departments were ready for freedom 
of information. 
The Liaison Committee in the House of Lords is more proactive when it comes to post-legislative 
scrutiny, than its House of Commons equivalent, as it formally recommends which committees are set 
up and what topics are examined. As such the ad hoc committees themselves are set up to undertake 
scrutiny into a particular Act and have no choice over the matter once it has been created. In terms of 
the factors that the House of Lords Liaison Committee takes into account, one of the key factors that 
the Committee takes into account is whether the inquiry would “make the best use of the expertise 
of Members of the House of Lords”45. Indeed one of the unique selling points of the second chamber 
is that it contains many people with expertise in different sectors, as such when undertaking post-
legislative scrutiny it is important to tap into that expertise as well.  
One other obvious criteria is whether the legislation or topic has been or is likely to be considered by 
a Commons committee. This is an important consideration; while resources are stretched it is 
important to ensure that there is as little overlap as possible between the two Houses. This is on the 
basis that if committees were assessing the same issue then it is a waste of resources but it would also 
raise the question of what else committees might be foregoing. It is also important here to take into 
account the primacy of the House of Commons46 as well as the general timidity of the House of Lords 
as a result of its unelected status47. 
Timing is also another important factor, in the sense that whether it is the right time to review the 
legislation. The Clerk noted that “there is an optimal time for post-legislative scrutiny and that is five 
to ten years after it has come into force”48. This is different from the time frame that the Cabinet Office 
guidelines suggests, with the publication of post-legislative memoranda (three-five years)49.  
Other criteria noted by Clerks include that “the Act should be a major one that has reformed the law 
in a fairly substantial way and to avoid anything too politically controversial”50. This is because the 
focus of post-legislative scrutiny is more on the Act itself rather than looking at the underlying politics 
of the policy. However this does restrict the House of Lords in terms of potential post-legislative 
scrutiny inquires. One other criterion the Clerk noted was to “avoid legislation that is about to be 
substantially amended” because there wouldn’t be much point in conducting a full review51. However 
that being said, surely there is an argument that if an Act were to be amended (even through another 
Act), that a post-legislative inquiry might help to inform such amendments. 
In relation to the Equality Act 2010, Baroness Thomas of Winchester put forward the proposal to look 
at the effect of the Equality Act on disability and as such the Liaison Committee limited the ad hoc 
committee to this. So far this is the only example where the Liaison Committee has restricted the 
scope of the inquiry but the Clerk admitted “it was the correct decision”52, as the Act was lengthy and 
complex. In the case of the Licensing Act, the committee was able to undertake a full review and 
decide for itself which particular parts of the Licensing Act they wanted to address. The Clerk noted 
                                                          
45 Interview with the Clerk of the House of Lords Liaison Committee. 
46 P. Norton. Reform of the House of Lords. Manchester, Manchester University Press. 2017. 
47 Russell, 2013. 
48 Interview with the Clerk of the House of Lords Liaison Committee. 
49 Cabinet Office, 2012. 
50 Interview with the former Clerk of the Select Committee on the Licensing Act 2003. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Interview with the former Clerk of the Select Committee on the Equality Act 2010 Committee. 
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that “it was a detailed piece of legislation and that it was a fairly compressed topic, as such there was 
no difficulty in dealing with it in one inquiry”53. 
With the processes of selection being different between the two Houses there is a clear difference in 
how they approach the criteria used to select legislation for post-legislative scrutiny with the House 
of Lords paying attention to its role as a chamber that adds value and complements the work of the 
House of Commons. A difference in selection is important, as if the criteria were the same then they 
may well be selecting similar legislation for review which, with limited resources, would be a waste.  
 
Differences in the outputs of post-legislative scrutiny 
In terms of the breakdown of full act based post-legislative scrutiny, the House of Commons has 
undertaken twelve inquires and the House of Lords has undertaken six. On average committees in the 
House of Commons produce 19 recommendations per report in comparison to 41 recommendations 
per report made by Lords committees. This difference can be accounted for by the ways in which the 
two different types of committees undertake post-legislative scrutiny. Unlike departmental select 
committees which have a large range of tasks, ad hoc committees have (usually) only the one task 
they were set up to undertake. As such they are able to dedicate a full session to the inquiry and 
produce more detailed scrutiny.  
Table one shows the types of recommendations being made by both Houses of Parliament. Firstly the 
table shows that proportionally the ad hoc committees of the House of Lords are making more 
recommendations calling for action in relation to legislation. The table also shows that the ad hoc 
committees of the House of Lords are producing more recommendations relating to policy and 
practice 
Table 1: Type of Recommendations from each House 
Type of Recommendation 
House of 
Commons  House of Lords 
  N % N % 
Policy and Practice 74 36 111 48 
Research/Review 53 26 25 11 
Related to legislation 25 12 49 21 
Disclosure  22 11 14 8 
Recommendations from other bodies 9 4 3 1 
Co-operation 8 4 3 1 
Funding and resources  7 3 5 3 
Campaigns/Public information 4 2 5 2 
Guidance 3 1 15 6 
Total 205 100 231 100 
 
In relation to the production of more recommendations calling for action relating to legislation this 
can be explained by the fact that the House of Lords often takes a more technical approach to scrutiny, 
as it does with the full line by line scrutiny it undertakes during the formal legislative process. Such 
                                                          
53  Interview with the former Clerk of the Select Committee on the Licensing Act 2003. 
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technical scrutiny mixed with the expertise and time ad hoc committee have to undertake their 
inquiries leads to more legislative recommendations. 
With regards to ad hoc committees producing more policy related recommendations, this could be a 
reflection that the House of Lords is willing to pressure the government with stronger 
recommendations on the basis that they can justify their decisions through expertise and experience. 
This is especially true if there are Members on a committee with particular experience of working in 
the field under examination meaning recommendations to carry more weight. 
Finally there is also a difference in terms of recommendations calling for research and review, with 
the Lords calling for fewer. This can be explained by the fact that committees in the Lords are able to 
hold an inquiry over an entire session and as such have more time to undertake more detailed review 
and potentially reach firmer conclusions than committees in the Commons. Indeed Clerks have noted 
that one of the reasons they produce recommendations such as research and review (generally seen 
as weaker recommendations) are due to a lack of evidence to back up a stronger call for action54. 
 
Table 2: Strength of Recommendations made from each House 
Strength of 
Recommendation 
House of 
Commons House of Lords 
  N % N % 
No 9 4 2 1 
Small 89 40 90 37 
Medium (A) 40 18 43 18 
Medium (B) 62 28 82 34 
Medium (C ) 21 9 23 9 
Large 3 1 4 2 
 Total 224 100 244 100 
 
Table two shows that there is only a limited difference between the House of Commons and the House 
of Lords in relation to the strength of the recommendations that committees in both Houses are 
producing. This suggests that there is some consistency here in terms of the strength of 
recommendations that are produced in both Houses. It is argued by Aldons55 and Benton & Russell56 
that committees use a strategy of producing weaker recommendations so that the government 
accepts more of them and as a result they appear more influential. While it is not possible to conclude 
that this is what is happening, the data from both Houses is showing what you might expect it to show 
if it were. 62% of House of Commons recommendations called for no, small or medium a action in 
comparison to 56% of House of Lords recommendations, so a majority of recommendations in both 
Houses are calling for weaker style recommendations. This difference could be explained by the more 
direct relationship that departmental select committees in the House of Commons have with 
government departments than ad hoc committees in the House of Lords. With a closer working 
relationship there may be a reluctance to make recommendations potentially deemed unrealistic by 
                                                          
54 Interview with a Clerk of a House of Commons Committee. 
55 M. Aldons. ‘Rating the Effectiveness of Parliamentary Committee Reports’. Legislative Studies. Vol. 15, 2000, pp. 22–32. 
56 Benton & Russell, 2013. 
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the government which could impact upon that working relationship. As without a productive 
relationship committees risk seeing their recommendations ignored57. 
Table one showed a larger proportion of recommendations calling for some kind of legislative action 
coming from the House of Lords, which are more likely to be classed as stronger recommendations. 
However with few recommendations calling for large change and the same proportion of 
recommendations calling for medium c change, it appears that the legislative recommendations that 
the House of Lords are making are not extreme in their strength (e.g. calling for the repeal of an Act 
or new legislation). 
 
Differences in the follow-up to government responses 
In relation to the House of Commons it has been noted that committees in general are not good at 
looking closely at government responses with the interviewees from the Gambling Act inquiry going 
as far as to say that this is because by the time they have produced their report they are tired of the 
issue58,59. However even if the Committee themselves don’t focus upon the government response, the 
staff do (Interview with the former Clerk of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee).  
In relation to the Culture, Media and Sport Committee’s inquiry into the Gambling Act, it was noted 
that “the Committee opted for a magisterial silence”60 suggesting that they were standing by their 
report, which they believed to be more dignified than getting into a war of words with the 
government.  While this may look like backing down, it might more accurately be named ‘picking your 
battles’61.  
In terms of the Committee’s follow up of the inquiry the Clerk noted that the Committee was 
“interested in following up on the bits of legislation that were brought forward in relation to online 
gambling”62. The Committee also followed it up with evidence with the Gambling Commission, and 
trawled through previous reports to find any recommendations they wanted to follow up63. 
Committees tend to take a holistic view with regards to the fact that a lot of the work they do will 
overlap with other inquiries. “They don’t want to lose sight of what they have recommended but they 
don’t necessarily think it is helpful to get a Minister in and go through a list of recommendations”64. It 
is clear that follow up in this case is very ad hoc. 
In relation to the inquiry into the Freedom of Information Act, the government’s response to the 
Committee’s report “wasn’t particularly effusive and the government backed off from making 
changes”65. The setting up of a Freedom of Information Commission in July 201566 meant it was put 
                                                          
57 White, 2015. 
58 Interview with the former Clerk of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee.  
59 Interview with Philip Davies MP, former Member of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee. 
60 Interview with the former Clerk of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee. 
61 Ibid 
62 Ibid 
63 Ibid 
64 Ibid 
65 Interview with the former committee legal specialist of the Justice Committee 
66 M. Rosenbaum. ‘FOI Commission: Why has it surprised observers?’. BBC News. 2016. Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-35550967. (Accessed on: 21st July 2017) 
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on hold. In the end, the Commission concluded that the Act was “working well”67and only 
recommended minor tweaking68, to the surprise of many, as the setting up of the Commission and its 
remit were deemed controversial69. 
The Committee didn’t do any official follow up to the inquiry. The Chair noted that “it wasn’t necessary 
at that stage to follow up because the government did back off and left things as they were”70, 
however they did regularly see the Information Commissioner. The Committee Lead noted that “if 
they had recommended some significant amendments they would have followed up on how those 
amendments had played out”71.  
A committee’s reaction to a government response is usually limited unless something has really 
irritated them and the focus is on the positive things that government said it would do in response to 
the report. When committees in the Commons respond it is usually through written correspondence 
or through routine oral evidence sessions. However this is different to the House of Lords. 
Ad hoc committees cease to function once they report and are therefore not formally constituted 
when the government’s response arrives and when it comes to following up. Thus the Lords Liaison 
Committee also plays a role in the follow up of post-legislative recommendations with the 
government. Usually one year after the publication of the report or one year after the government’s 
response to the report has been published, to allow the government some time to implement the 
recommendations. The fact that “ad hoc committees dissolve after the publication of their report is 
seen as one of the weaknesses, if not the main weaknesses of House of Lords ad hoc committees”72. 
To combat the challenges facing follow up, the Liaison Committee decided to follow up on specific 
recommendations in writing with the relevant government department. “At the end of each inquiry 
the Liaison Committee will ask the committee to place an asterisk next to or otherwise highlight the 
recommendations they want to be followed up”73. A downside is that this approach may signal to the 
government that there are going to be certain recommendations that the committee won’t follow up 
on and as such create an incentive for inaction in these areas. The Clerk also noted that she and her 
team “do not have the civil service contacts and relationships that Chairs and their secretariat build 
up during a nine month inquiry”74. The expertise is held by the ad hoc committee secretariat who by 
this point have moved on to another committee. In terms of the role that the Liaison Committee plays 
following up priority recommendations, the Clerk of one of the ad hoc committees noted that “while 
some formal follow up is better than none”, he doesn’t think “it makes a great difference”75. Indeed 
it is questionable how effective such a mechanism can be as through writing a single letter is unlikely 
to apply much pressure on the government to act.  
                                                          
67 Ibid 
68 B. Worthy. The Politics of Freedom of Information. Manchester, Manchester University Press. 2017. 
69 B. Worthy & R. Hazell. ‘Disruptive, Dynamic and Democratic? Ten Years of FOI in the UK’. Parliamentary Affairs. 
Vol. 70, No. 1, 2016, pp. 22–42. 
70 Interview with Lord Beith, former Chair of the Justice Committee. 
71 Interview with the former committee legal specialist of the Justice Committee. 
72 Interview with the Clerk of the House of Lords Liaison Committee. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid 
75 Interview with the former Clerk of the Select Committee on the Equality Act 2010 and disability. 
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In relation to both case studies on the House of Lords, Clerks noted that “although the committees 
ceases to exist, the Members continue to be Members of the House of Lords and retain their 
interest”76 This was also supported by Baroness McIntosh who noted that she would continue to ask 
questions relating to the inquiry77 and Baroness Deech who noted the Equality Act inquiry sought to 
continue work with the House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee to further their 
recommendations78. When government responses come they are circulated to Members by the Clerk. 
There is clearly an informal process going on here, although they do not have the powers of the 
committee at hand, if Members who retain an interest can organize and apply pressure themselves 
then they might achieve more than if they worked independently. One of the Clerks views the lack of 
being able to reform as a committee following the government’s response (and potentially later to 
follow up) “as a major failure of post-legislative scrutiny in the Lords”79. 
The Liaison Committee has also experimented with debates on reports. However a limitation of this is 
that the time on the floor of the House is limited. The Clerk of the Liaison Committee noted that “there 
was nothing she or the Committee could do that would ever likely be enough for Members in 
general”80. One of the Clerks noted that “this process doesn’t necessarily take you any further forward 
in terms of getting the government to agree to your recommendations unless you get a commitment 
from them”81. Floor time in the House potentially brings publicity both within and outside the House, 
but it is questionable how much publicity it will bring. 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude there are a number of differences in the way legislation is selected by both Houses of 
Parliament. In the House of Commons there is a focus upon representations from outside 
organisations, the legislative intensity of government departments, the production of memoranda and 
the salience of issues. In relation to the House of Lords, the focus is upon its subservient role in the UK 
Parliament. For example it focuses on considerations of whether committees in the Commons are 
likely to undertake post-legislative scrutiny. It is also more focused upon the more technical aspects 
such as whether the timing is correct. There is also a focus upon whether it is a major piece of 
legislation and whether they have the expertise to do it well.  
This paper has also highlighted the differences between the two Houses of Parliament in terms of the 
output of their recommendations. In terms of the average number of post-legislative scrutiny 
recommendations produced by each House, the House of Lords on average produces 41 per report 
and the Commons, 19 per report. This will be a reflection on the amount of time that the House of 
Lords can spend on each inquiry. The data showed that there was a greater focus upon legislative style 
recommendations in the Lords but the strength between both Houses is somewhat similar suggesting 
those legislative style recommendations are not calling for large legislative change. 
In terms of follow up the research showed that there were similarities between the two Houses on 
the basis that their follow up leaves a lot to be desired. If committees in the House of Commons do 
                                                          
76 Ibid. 
77 Interview with Baroness McIntosh, former Chair of the Select Committee on the Licensing Act 2003. 
78 Interview with Baroness Deech, former Chair of the Select Committee on the Equality Act 2010 and 
disability. 
79 Interview with the former Clerk of the Select Committee on the Equality Act 2010 and disability. 
80 Interview with the Clerk of the House of Lords Liaison Committee. 
81 Interview with the former Clerk of the Select Committee on the Equality Act 2010 and disability. 
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follow up, then they use convenient methods, such as written correspondence or annual oral evidence 
sessions, rather than undertaking a follow up inquiry. This makes sense due to the time and resource 
pressures on House of Commons committees. This is different to the House of Lords, the challenges 
ad hoc committees face are procedural as they dissolve after the publication of their report. While the 
Liaison Committee does provide the only follow up likely in the Lords, it is limited to written follow up. 
However changes could be made to make the process run more smoothly, such as allowing ad hoc 
committees to re-form after a report has been published, and perhaps a year later for follow up. 
To an extent this is a tale of two Houses as each House is operating its own slightly different system 
of post-legislative scrutiny, with limited co-operation. This has implications for other bicameral 
legislatures, especially those yet to introduce post-legislative scrutiny formally, on the basis that they 
need to determine whether to introduce a joined up system of scrutiny or to have a separate system 
in each House. 
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Appendices  
Coding Schemes 
Detailed below are some of the important codes that have been referred to in the main body of the 
article. The coding schemes were tested and trailed and each recommendation was double coded to 
ensure validity.  
 
Strength of action called for 
Captures the strength of the action which the recommendations called for, this took place on a six 
point scale. 
0) No Action – for recommendations which support or endorse existing policy and/or 
legislation. 
 
1) Small Action – for recommendations which call for information to be released, for guidance 
to be issued/amended and for reviews, assessments and further consideration to be taken. 
 
2) Medium (a) – for recommendations which call for a pause in a policy, for a pilot/trail run to 
be undertaken, for a change in practice, for additional resources or training to be made 
available, for the implementation of parts of an Act and for existing legislation to be utilized. 
 
3) Medium (b) – for recommendations which call for policy changes, new regulations or for 
regulations to be amended and for minor amendments to be made to an Act (e.g. for 
drafting purposes). 
 
4) Medium (c) – for recommendations which call for substantial amendments (relating to 
powers) or for the repeal of specific clauses of an Act, additionally for recommendations 
which call on the Government to legislate but do not specifically call for primary legislation.  
 
5) Large – for recommendations that call for the repeal of all or part of an Act or for new 
legislation to be introduced.  
 
Government Acceptance  
Captures the extent to which the recommendations produced by committees were accepted by the 
government, this took place on a six point scale.  
(0)   No response – for recommendations that did not receive a direct written response within the 
Government’s response, or for recommendations which are not acknowledged explicitly or 
implicitly in the government’s response. 
 
(1)  Rejected outright – for recommendations where the government states that it rejects or 
disagrees or through its response signals outright rejection.  
 
(2) Partially rejected – for recommendations that were part rejected and part ignored, or where 
the government dodged the point the recommendation made, including suggestions that the 
recommendation was not necessary. Additionally for recommendations where the 
government rejects but acknowledges frustration or where the government states that it has 
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a policy/initiative (which is different to what the recommendation calls for) already in place 
to deal with the issue raised by the recommendation.  
 
(3) Neither accepted nor rejected – for recommendations which were accepted in part and 
rejected in part. Also for recommendations which received lukewarm support (e.g. saying the 
recommendation required further consideration) or where it is not clear whether the 
recommendation is accepted or rejected. 
 
(4) Partially accepted – for recommendations where there was agreement with the general 
thrust (in principle) but not the finer detail which the committee called for. Also for 
recommendations which were accepted in part and ignored in part. Finally for 
recommendations where the government accepts the objective or principle of a 
recommendation but proposes an alternative policy or initiative to that recommended by the 
report. 
 
(5) Fully accepted – for recommendations where the government states that it accepts or agrees, 
or through its response signals full acceptance or for recommendations where the 
government claimed the committee’s demands were already in progress. 
 
 
 
